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New York

President:	Mr. Vassilakis	(Greece)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. García Moritán
	China	Mr. Li Junhua
	Congo	Mr. Biabaorroh-Iboro
	Denmark	Ms. Løj
	France	Mr. Lacroix
	Ghana	Mr. Yankey
	Japan	Mr. Oshima
	Peru	Ms. Tincopa
	Qatar	Mr. Al-Qahtani
	Russian Federation	Mr. Dolgov
	Slovakia	Mr. Burian
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Lord Triesman
	United Republic of Tanzania	Mr. Mapongi
	United States of America	Mr. Bolton

Agenda

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan (S/2006/728)

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06-52553 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan (S/2006/728)

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan.

It is so decided.

I invite Mr. Pronk to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, document S/2006/728.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by Mr. Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan. I now give the floor to Mr. Pronk.

Mr. Pronk: I last briefed the Council half a year ago, in March (see S/PV.5392). At that time, I said that the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the north and the south was on track. It still is. However, it is a bumpy ride, and the train can easily derail. The peace is fragile, and the confidence gap between the north and the south is widening.

I am glad to report that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) has completed almost 100 per cent — exactly 99 per cent — of its deployment in southern Sudan. We have fulfilled our mandate in eastern Sudan and have withdrawn the troops from the area. The authorities have given assurances that United Nations humanitarian and development efforts will continue unhindered.

The withdrawal of the United Nations from the east has sent a strong signal to the people of the Sudan that the United Nations came to eastern Sudan upon the invitation of the Government, accomplished its task and left. There was no hidden agenda to occupy or to colonize, as is the ongoing rhetoric about the United Nations vis-à-vis other parts of the country.

We continue to monitor the Eritrean-mediated talks between the Sudanese Government and the Eastern Front, which, at last, began in Asmara three months ago. They are taking place without the United Nations and without others as international observers. That is different from the north-south talks in Naivasha or the Darfur talks in Abuja, but the parties have the right, and they deserve the opportunity, to try to reach an agreement all by themselves. They have informed us that they expect to sign an agreement before the commencement of Ramadan, and that is very soon.

Concerns, however, remain: an asymmetry of the talks between a strong Government of the Sudan and a weak Eastern Front, and a possible disconnect between the leaders of the Eastern Front and their constituencies on the ground. Moreover, the talks should not take the shape of negotiations between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of Eritrea about, but without, the people of the east. Their true participation is essential in order to restore security and to tackle the root causes of the conflict.

As for the south itself, CPA implementation in southern Sudan, although slow, remains on course. The government of Southern Sudan, which with limited resources has been working hard to transform southern Sudan from a war-torn region into a region with a functioning administration has done a good job. The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly meets regularly and is a forum for healthy debate and accountability. President Kiir has reshuffled his cabinet and his administration in order to enhance good governance and abate corruption. His recent 200-day action plan is a courageous effort to engender a culture in public service that is action-oriented and puts the needs of the people at the forefront. The political environment has encouraged relatively free media. With the cooperation of the government of Southern Sudan, United Nations Radio Miraya — Radio Mirror — started broadcasting

at the end of June 2006 and is being well appreciated throughout southern Sudan.

The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) remains the cornerstone of the Peace Agreement. Chaired by the United Nations, it is the best-functioning institution of the CPA. The redeployment of the forces is on track. On 9 July 2007, all Sudanese armed forces will have to be withdrawn from the south. I have no reason to expect that this will not happen. However, the presence of the so-called other armed groups poses a threat. The Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee envisioned in the CPA has started meeting, but the actual alignment status, composition and location of these groups remains vague. In a number of areas in the south, commanders of the former alternative movement, the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), have refused to abide by the joint Juba declaration, adopted earlier this year, which provides for their integration into the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Many people in the south suspect that the north is still supporting these commanders in order to destabilize the south, to control disputed areas and oil fields and to create uncertainty about the border.

Six months ago, I highlighted the factors behind the ongoing violence in the south. Since then, the violence has not decreased. On the contrary, we have had to deal with it throughout southern Sudan — tribal conflicts, land and water disputes, cattle looting, an abundance of arms, fights between settlers and nomads, youth unemployment and crime and a lack of discipline among unpaid soldiers, in addition to the presence of the other armed groups and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). However, our presence in southern Sudan has helped. In cooperation with the government of Southern Sudan, our military, together with the humanitarian and the civilian elements of the mission, has been able to prevent escalations. Any cannibalization of forces for diversion to another part of Sudan, therefore, will have consequences for the peace in southern Sudan. UNMIS, the nightwatchman, should not be asked to pack up and go somewhere else in the afternoon.

At the same time, there is a need for international assistance in security-sector reform. The formation and training of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) is way behind schedule. There has been a rise in cases of indiscipline in SPLA. International help, from a number of countries, which I do not have in my United Nations mandate, is urgently required to train the SPLA into a professional and democratic army.

Southern Sudan remains in urgent need of reconstruction and developmental assistance. The absence of basic facilities like water, sanitation, health care and education has now forced the people to question what difference peace has made in their lives and those of their children. Some progress has been made. Between January and June this year, over 300 kilometres of roads have been cleared of mines and repaired. The UNICEF "Go to School" campaign has provided school supplies to 1.6 million southern Sudanese schoolchildren. However, coverage stands at only half of the funding for this year's requirements as presented in our work plan. This also affects our capacity to provide services for returning refugees and displaced people. An estimated 160,000 people returned between January and July this year. With the end of the rainy season approaching, large numbers of returnees will be in urgent need of basic services. In the coming year we shall need more funds for relief and return and for reconstruction and development. The people in southern Sudan are still heartbreakingly poor.

The performance of the National Congress Party (NCP) within the Government of National Unity is not encouraging. The NCP has accepted CPA in letter but seems to ignore it in spirit. It continues to stall the functioning of almost all critical institutions of the CPA and has not accepted, to this day, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) as an equal partner. The isolation of SPLM ministers who are part of the Government of National Unity has created an asymmetry in the Government, thereby relegating "making unity attractive", which is part of our mandate, to a distant dream. This asymmetry has also caused every important issue to be put on the back burner.

We had high expectations of the long-awaited Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC), which to our disappointment has turned out to be a forum that has yet to resolve a single one of the issues forwarded by CJMC. Instead of acting as a political body that solves political questions, CPC has become a legalistic club preserving the status quo. It has acted merely as a secretariat that steers every contentious issue towards the Presidency, where the outcome has been no different.

No progress has been made on the issue of Abyei. As a result, Abyei remains devoid of any governance structure, leaving the people without any formal policing, public sanitation or health services. Abyei is the test case for CPA implementation.

In the key area of oil, the parties continue to disagree on the status of the National Petroleum Commission. The calculation and subsequent distribution of oil revenues lack the transparency needed to ensure fairness and accuracy.

The demarcation of the north-south border remains unresolved. The Border Committee has yet to undertake any substantive work. This task is urgent because the absence of a clearly delineated border has consequences for the redeployment of forces, the distribution of oil revenues, JIU formation, the elections and, eventually, the referendum.

Progress in the peace talks between the Government of Uganda and LRA is a reason for hope. LRA has agreed to bring together its forces — which turned out to be much larger than we had expected — in assembly areas in southern Sudan. If the present cessation of hostilities lasts, peace can be brought to northern Uganda, and this will have a significant spillover effect in the region, including in the Sudan.

The State security structure in northern Sudan continues to harass and intimidate all opposition to the Government. There has been a crackdown on political freedoms in the country, with heavy-handed tactics used against peaceful demonstrations by the opposition and by civilians protesting against Government policies. Human rights violations, in particular by the State security forces, have not decreased. No progress has been made in bringing national security laws into line with the new Constitution.

As stated during my last briefing, I had commended the decision of the Governor of Khartoum to cease all forced relocations from the IDP camps around Khartoum. I am pleased to announce that he has stood by his decision. However, last month, the authorities in the neighbouring state of Gezira began demolishing the houses of a large community in the Dar Assalam camp, using overwhelming force. Thousands of families have been forcibly relocated to places that have no basic services. This inhumane treatment is a violation of international humanitarian law. It is also far below what was expected after the adoption of the new Constitution.

I am alarmed at the recent kidnapping and beheading, in Khartoum, of Mr. Mohammad Taha, editor-in-chief of the Sudanese newspaper *Al-Wifaq*. This brutal murder has been claimed by Al-Qaida. True or not, the style of execution is alien to the Sudanese environment and is indicative of a foreign presence. Other journalists have received similar threats. This is an attack on freedom of expression. This heinous crime can roll back any progress made in liberalizing the media through forced self-censorship. That would be a setback. Since the adoption of the Constitution, in mid-2005, the Sudanese press has become politically more diversified and agile, using its rights and freedoms, as it should do in a country striving for democracy.

During my last brief I commended the Government for concluding the status-of-forces agreement. However, I cautioned that the implementation of the agreement would indicate its success or failure. I am not so positive any more. The authorities continue to arrest and detain UNMIS national staff members. Recently two international staff members were also manhandled and arrested. The Government has refused to allow any broadcasts by UN Radio in northern Sudan, including Darfur. It has restricted United Nations access in Abyei. Intentional delays — often more than eight months long — in clearing critical equipment through customs at Khartoum airport are severely impacting our operations. Our monitors have not been given full access to detention facilities, in particular those run by national security. All in all, that hinders the work mandated to us by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was signed by the Government, and is a violation of the status-of-forces agreement.

I now turn to Darfur. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is only four months old, but it is nearly dead. It is in a coma. It ought to be under intensive care, but it is not.

It is a good Agreement. The peace talks resulted in a balanced text, somewhere in the middle of the extreme positions taken by the Government and the rebel movements. Had they continued negotiating another year, the outcome would have been more or less the same. In hindsight, maybe we should have taken more time — not to get a better agreement, but in order to bring on board all parties. Only the Government and the Mini Minawi faction of the Sudanese Liberation Movement have signed. Abdul Wahid's faction did not sign. They should have. They

were wrong, but they took a political decision to stand aside. That does not make them terrorists. Abdul Wahid's people, most of them Furs, the largest African tribe of Darfur, stood aside, but they have not reverted to fighting either. They have kept the earlier agreement that they had signed, so we have to bring them on board. That is the first condition for bringing the DPA out of its coma.

After the signing of the DPA, parties which did not sign were excluded from the institutions, in particular from the Ceasefire Commission (CFC). That, too, was wrong. They were told: First sign, then talk. That further split the rebel movements. There are now five to seven different groups, including the National Redemption Front, which in July launched an attack in West Kordofan. We have condemned that attack. Sadly, it provided the Government with an excuse for continuous attacks and air raids under the pretext that the civilian population had to be protected. However, it is an outright violation of the DPA. We need a truce. That is the second condition for bringing the DPA out of its coma. Mini Minawi can play a role, maybe, in mediating between his present and his former allies in order to finally get peace on the ground.

Since its signing, the DPA has been violated day after day, week after week. There was a rise in violence after the signing of the DPA. The use of rape as a tool of terror is frequent and again on the rise. The attackers show little mercy towards women and children. Villages are being attacked and bombed in the middle of the night. White helicopters are being used to support the offensive operations of the Sudan Armed Forces. The freedom of movement of humanitarian and other United Nations workers has been severely curtailed and violence against them stepped up. Twelve of them have been killed just in the past two months. The situation in and around the camps remains precarious, and violence by militia against internally displaced persons, including women, is brutal and degrading.

The tragedy is that none of the violations has been addressed in the CFC. It simply does not function. It has been hijacked by the signatories, it is not well chaired, non-signatories have been excluded, and the United Nations has been silenced. In the southern Sudan, the CJMC is one of the most important pillars of the CPA. If it were taken out, the CPA would be paralyzed. That is exactly the present state of the DPA, so the third condition is to start addressing the violations of the DPA through a renewed, fully representative, but authoritative CFC.

Since the DPA does not function, violations remain unsanctioned. Most people in Darfur have lost faith in the DPA. Many did not have it from the beginning. We should be realistic. The DPA in its present form, even though it is theoretically a good agreement, will not get adequate support beyond those who have already signed. We will have to start new consultations, but we must avoid labelling those consultations as a reopening of the peace negotiations. We must talk, add, improve and give an opportunity to those who feel excluded and form at least one third of the population of Darfur. We must get their interests guaranteed, on paper as well as in reality. That is the fourth condition for bringing the DPA out of its coma.

There is a fifth condition. The Security Council, in adopting resolution 1706 (2006), made it crystal clear that the international community wants a transition from the present African Union peacekeeping force to a United Nations force. The Council has also invited the consent of the Government to that deployment. From its side, since February the Government has also been crystal clear. It is against the transition. That is unwise. UNMIS has proven to be a fair and effective peacekeeper in the southern Sudan. We can and will do the same in Darfur.

The United Nations does not deserve the insinuations from the Sudanese political leadership in power. We do not intend to recolonize, nor are we laying a carpet for others to do so. We do not have a hidden agenda. Our only aim is to protect the people, while respecting the sovereignty of the Sudanese nation. Secretary-General Kofi Anan has clearly said that "without the consent of the Sudanese Government, the transition will not be possible". However, getting the consent of the Government requires consultations. A transition to a United Nations force has to be made attractive to the Sudanese leadership in order to get its support. That also requires trust, confidence-building and time. It requires that those in favour of a transition and those against it should refrain from the present collision course. It also requires that the present African Union force stay until the consent is acquired. The African Union is less effective than it was a year ago, but its presence is essential. The departure of the African Union would leave the people in the camps unprotected and vulnerable to anyone who would wish

to harm them and resume the cleansing of 2003 and 2004.

Those are five essential conditions to revive the DPA and bring it out of its coma. Together they would form a plan for the short-term — say, until the end of the year. If we do that, we can work out a plan for the period thereafter. On the basis of our experience on the ground, we will be more than happy to share with the Council our views on the contours of such a plan for the longer term.

The five points, therefore, are: get everybody on board; establish a truce; reform the CFC; resume talks to improve the DPA; and get off the collision course, both within the Sudan as well as internationally. In short, de-link what should be done today to save the DPA from tomorrow's actions to get a renewed and fully robust peace force on the ground.

The President: I thank Mr. Pronk for his briefing.

As there is no list of speakers for this meeting, I would invite Council members who wish to take the floor to so indicate to the Secretariat.

On behalf of the members of the Council, I extend a warm welcome to Lord Triesman, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.

Lord Triesman (United Kingdom): May I begin by thanking Special Representative Pronk for his comprehensive briefing and for all of the efforts that he and his team are making to bring peace and security to the Sudan. The progress in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) owes a great deal to their efforts. Special Representative Pronk has also made plain this afternoon the continuing problems.

We must continue to work to underpin the CPA, where the United Nations Mission in southern Sudan has played such a valuable role. As was borne out in the Council's visit to the Sudan in May, it is clear that embedding peace in southern Sudan also depends upon on our ability to secure peace in Darfur.

On 31 August, the Council decided to authorize a United Nations mission to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The Council remains united in its view that a United Nations force is the only solution to the crisis in Darfur. The African Union (AU) itself and the Council have favoured transition from the AU to the United Nations in Darfur for many months. We have all recognized that the complex task of implementing the DPA requires a larger, better supported and multidimensional peace operation. That is no reflection on the exceptional efforts of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), which has done a remarkable job in very difficult circumstances but, rather, a recognition, fully shared by Africa's leaders, that the United Nations is best placed to provide the sustainable and comprehensive international peacebuilding support that Darfur needs.

It is unacceptable that the Government of the Sudan has so far refused to accept the idea of a United Nations force in Darfur, despite its successful cooperation with the United Nations force with an almost identical mandate in southern Sudan. Worse, the Government of the Sudan has proposed its own approach to implementing by military force the Darfur Peace Agreement, an approach that violates the Agreement and the Government's commitment to it, as well as resolution 1590 (2005) and 1591 (2005). In the words of Kofi Annan, that will be catastrophic for the people of the region.

We are now at a tipping point for the future of Darfur. Antagonists, as we have just heard, have returned to violence, and humanitarian groups and AMIS forces are losing lives, along with the innocent people of Darfur. We need to arrest that collapse into chaos. My Government sees the priorities for resolving the tragedy of Darfur as clear and compelling.

First, the Government of the Sudan and rebel groups must immediately stop fighting in Darfur — what Special Representative Pronk called a truce.

Secondly, non-signatories must accept the Darfur Peace Agreement, and it must be implemented by all.

Thirdly, we must prevent the development of a security vacuum. The Government of the Sudan must agree to the continuation of the African Union force and accept its transition to a United Nations force. We have to ask, in full recognition of the gravity of such a request, that the African Union Peace and Security Council continue its brave and arduous task of peacekeeping in Darfur while we intensify efforts to persuade the Government of the Sudan to accept a United Nations force to succeed AMIS. We look

forward to the crucial AU meeting to be held later this week.

The United Nations and all of us must deepen and accelerate our support of AMIS and, more generally, of the humanitarian relief effort in Darfur.

I am sure that we are clear why the United Nations has a right and duty to make this case to the Government of the Sudan. The scale of the disaster is already immense: 200,000 innocent people have died; almost 2 million have been displaced from their homes; nearly 3 million people in Darfur depend upon international aid for their survival, half a million being cut off from that aid by the fighting; and 50,000 more people have been displaced in the past couple of weeks. Imagine what further deterioration could bring. The regional implications — for Chad in particular — of the present crisis and the risk of a downward spiral are of obvious concern. We urgently need proposals to provide humanitarian assistance and security to the camps in eastern Chad.

The moral imperative for the international community to act, set out so eloquently by the Secretary-General in the Chamber last week, is clear. Every United Nations Member State at the Summit last year embraced the concept of the responsibility to protect. The Council affirmed it in a resolution drafted by the United Kingdom on the protection of civilians, which was adopted unanimously this spring and later recalled in resolution 1706 (2006), which was also drafted by the United Kingdom, three weeks ago.

This is first and foremost a responsibility for the State concerned to exercise, to protect its own citizens. It is clear that the Sudan is not protecting its people in Darfur, quite the contrary. In such cases the responsibility to protect means that the international community has a right to get involved, primarily in efforts to help the State concerned to carry out its responsibilities. That is what the United Nations has done in southern Sudan, and it is what we will all want to see happen in Darfur.

But our responsibility cannot end there if our offers of help are turned away. We cannot, in all conscience, allow the situation in Darfur to slide from crisis to catastrophe because of the ill-founded fears of the Government of Khartoum. We must therefore redouble our efforts — in the United Nations, the AU, the European Union, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference — as friends of the Sudan and its peoples, to make clear the positive contribution the United Nations will make in Darfur, in full respect of the sovereignty of the Sudan and with a heavy African character to the force, as the Council has repeatedly made clear. We must also make clear the benefits of peace for the Sudan's Government and people in economic, political, security and humanitarian terms. The Sudan is a country with great economic resources. It should be an economic powerhouse, not a humanitarian crisis spot. And we should make clear that the responsibility for failures, increased conflict and death in Darfur will not rest with the United Nations, but with those responsible. It will be down to those who deny a United Nations peacekeeping force to the people of Darfur and who reject the offer of international support for the DPA and the sovereignty of the Sudan set out in resolution 1706 (2006). That is not a scenario that we want to realize; but it is a road that we may well have to travel if the Government of the Sudan does not relent in its opposition to the will and decisions of the international community.

The United Nations was established to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. In Darfur, as in southern Sudan, peace, not war is in prospect. But, in Darfur in particular, that prospect now hangs by a thread, and if that thread snaps, the people of Darfur will pay a terrible price.

If our United Nations and this Council mean anything, we must make the effort to avert that. On 11 September this year, Kofi Annan asked the Council a question: "Can the international community, having not done enough for the people of Rwanda in their time of need, just watch as this tragedy deepens?" (*S/PV.5520, p. 3*). The answer to the question of the Secretary-General is a simple "no". If the Government of the Sudan is genuinely concerned about the welfare and protection of its citizens, there is no reason for it not to give its consent to a United Nations force.

For us today, it is not about saving face; it is about saving lives. We should make clear what the Sudan can expect from the international community if it shoulders its responsibilities in Darfur. And what it can expect if it does not. No one should doubt the international determination to see the conflict resolved.

Mr. García Moritán (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jan

Pronk, for his comprehensive briefing, of which we would like to emphasize the following elements. First, the observations concerning the limited progress in the parties' fulfilment of their obligations under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement are not reassuring. We believe that further progress in key areas is necessary, such as with regard to the obligation to share power and wealth, especially as concerns oil.

We would also like to mention that legislation necessary to establish the national human rights, civil service, land and electoral commissions is still pending. At the same time, even though some of the various ceasefire bodies are working well and have had a significant role in the peaceful resolution of several incidents that have occurred, the authorities continue to impose restrictions on the activities of the monitors of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in Abyei, which constitute a clear violation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Those restrictions are among the instances of non-compliance with the commitments entered into by the Government in the status-of-forces agreement. Others include, for example, the arrest and detention of UNMIS national staff. We urge the authorities to fully comply with their commitments, and we urge the parties to implement fully, and not selectively, the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

We also urge the Government to immediately lift the restrictions imposed on humanitarian access, especially in the states of Kassala, Red Sea and Gedaref, and to coordinate with UNMIS the assistance necessary to relocate communities, in order to avoid a recurrence of incidents like the one that occurred in Dar Assalam on 16 and 17 August.

As Mr. Pronk indicated, the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has entered a new phase that is full of challenges, and substantial progress should be made in the areas of security-sector reform, police reform and restructuring and preparing for the return of internally displaced persons, the national census and future elections, while continuing active disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes to reduce the scourge of the grave problem of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. All of that, without any doubt, will contribute to bringing the population closer to realizing the benefits of the peace for which they have been hoping for so long.

However, that peace will be possible only if the entire country is at peace, once the critical situation that we are all aware of in Darfur ends in the framework of a lasting solution that is not based on coercion and violence.

The state of coma that Mr. Pronk has just described with regard to the Darfur Peace Agreement is of great concern. Mr. Pronk was very clear that it is necessary to support the forces of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), and that the Government of Khartoum must give its consent to the deployment to Darfur of United Nations forces as well — in other words, the immediate implementation of resolution 1706 (2006). We should not forget our responsibility to protect, and we must, therefore, respond.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is the bedrock on which the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement must be built. It is necessary that both instruments enjoy the support of all parties, because they constitute negotiated political solutions of both conflicts. Only in that way will it be possible to leave behind conflict and instability and lay the foundations for a society based on equality and respect for human rights for all.

Mr. Lacroix (France) (*spoke in French*): First, I would like to thank Mr. Pronk for the briefing he has just given to the Council. In his briefing, as well as in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2006/728), we noted a number of encouraging points that I would like to mention at the outset, with respect to southern Sudan. The stability of the security situation and the humanitarian situation is a positive element, because without that, no progress would be possible. Yet we must not forget the stark situation in southern Sudan, as alluded to by the Special Representative, and the scope of the development challenges posed in that region.

Implementation of the security elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is encouraging. In Juba last June, the Security Council mission noted the operation of the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee. The withdrawal of armed forces from certain areas where they had previously been deployed was generally done in accordance with the Agreement and constituted a step in the right direction.

With respect to the east, the holding of talks offers hope that there will be a peaceful resolution of the problems in that area, without, we hope, going

through the trials that other outlying areas of the country have had to endure.

Finally, we hope that the 26 August signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army will help improve the security situation for the people of the southern Sudan.

In spite of those elements, which we welcome, it is clear that the peace process in the southern Sudan remains very fragile. In addition to security questions, there has been considerable delay on a number of key elements of the Agreement — at least those on which there is not total deadlock. That is of even greater concern as those different areas, in particular the wealth-sharing and power-sharing, are issues that touch upon the root causes of the conflict.

I would like to recall that the United Nations has agreed to send troops to southern Sudan, in an effort that is not only large-scale, but also long-term. The timetable initially set out in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement had a duration of more than six years. Thus, we must ensure that the effort will not continue indefinitely. Here, I would be grateful to Mr. Pronk if he told the Council whether — apart from the rescheduling of national elections from 2008 to 2009 — that timetable could be jeopardized by the current delays.

My delegation is sorry to note that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) continues to encounter a number of administrative difficulties, sometimes in spite of the terms of the status-of-forces agreement. It seems to us that eliminating those difficulties would be the first — and undoubtedly the simplest — measure that the Government of National Unity could take to accelerate the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Finally, my delegation would like to reiterate its very deep concern with respect to the situation in Darfur. In that regard, Mr. Pronk has described some disturbing developments and their consequences for the civilian population.

My delegation recently had an opportunity to tell the Security Council what its position is on the subject and, in particular, to emphasize the need to continue to make steadfast efforts, in particular with respect to the Sudanese Government, so that the United Nations will be able to take over from the African Union operation as quickly as possible in accordance with resolution 1706 (2006).

I would like to ask Mr. Pronk a question. We have noted the elements he set out regarding the very difficult situation with respect to the Darfur Peace Agreement, inter alia because a number of groups have not agreed to sign it. I would like to ask Mr. Pronk for some details on how, through the new discussions with the parties that he mentioned, those who did not sign the Darfur Peace Agreement could be persuaded to join it.

Mr. Bolton (United States of America): I would like to thank Special Representative Pronk for his briefing here today and to thank the Secretary-General for his report dated 12 September 2006 (S/2006/728). That report shows that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and the wider United Nations system have played a key role in support of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

The parties' efforts to implement the CPA's security provisions have reduced the likelihood of future conflict in southern Sudan. While there is still much to be done, the parties have shown they can continue to resolve long-standing problems through cooperation. That has been done in an atmosphere of security buttressed by United Nations peacekeepers.

In the coming days, it will be crucial for a similar de-escalation of conflict to occur in the Darfur area of Sudan as well. We deplore the ongoing violence in Darfur and the consequent deterioration of the humanitarian situation. At this critical juncture, it is imperative that the Security Council reiterate the need for the transition of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a United Nations operation consistent with resolution 1706 (2006) and with the precedent of resolution 1590 (2005).

Just as the Government of National Unity has shown itself able to overcome decades of violence in southern Sudan through respect for the CPA and cooperation with the United Nations peacekeeping mission, so should it be prepared to ensure a better future for its citizens in Darfur through respect for the Darfur Peace Agreement, through a strengthening of the AMIS operation and through cooperation in the deployment of UNMIS forces in Darfur.

This afternoon, we will circulate a draft resolution on the Sudan on which we plan to convene an experts meeting tomorrow, Tuesday, 19 September. The draft resolution will be to renew the mandate of UNMIS, set to expire 24 September, for a period of six months, so that we can ensure continuity of United Nations operations in the south. The draft resolution will also take into consideration the expansion of UNMIS through resolution 1706 (2006). It is critical that we expand these missions concurrently to ensure that urgent assistance to AMIS, as stipulated in resolution 1706 (2006), is not jeopardized.

In addition, I would like to call the attention of Council members to an invitation that was extended today by Denmark and the United States, at the request of our two foreign ministers, to invite the foreign ministers of Council members to a meeting of interested parties on the situation in the Sudan this Friday, 22 September, at 4 p.m. The Government of Denmark and the Government of the United States have invited ministers of all the members of the Council as well as the foreign ministers of Canada, South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Rwanda, the Netherlands, Chad, Norway, Egypt and Algeria. We very much hope that ministers will be able to attend.

Ms. Løj (Denmark): Let me start by thanking Jan Pronk for his briefing, which was, as usual, a very eloquent and thorough update on the situation. The progress made by all parties in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in particular in the area of security, is indeed very welcome. In this regard, I should like to recognize the important role played by the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). We have also taken note of the reported difficulties and selectiveness in implementing the CPA, and we fully subscribe to the Secretary-General's statement that none of commitments enshrined in the CPA are optional. In particular, the lack of adherence to the CPA in respect of Abyei gives rise to concern. The expectation of peace dividends has yet to be met. That could seriously undermine popular support for the CPA, and it warrants our close attention and support in the coming months.

Sudan figures high on the agenda in New York this week. Unfortunately, that is due not to the progress made in implementing the CPA but, rather, to the extremely worrying situation in Darfur. This week, the African Union Peace and Security Council is meeting to discuss the future of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). We very much welcome the active dialogue that African leaders have pursued with President Al-Bashir over the past couple of days in Havana. We hope this week's intensified efforts will bear fruit and allow for the immediate and full implementation of resolution 1706 (2006).

Last week, the Council had two open meetings, where we heard alarming reports of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Darfur, of military build-up, aerial attacks and the high risk of the Darfur Peace Agreement falling apart. I will not repeat the points I made during those discussions, but will limit myself to emphasizing the possible spillover to the south. There are already warning signs that further deterioration in Darfur will create difficulties in upholding the CPA and could potentially destabilize the relations between the north and the south.

The stakes are high for the government of Southern Sudan. We welcome President Kiir's recent statement of support for the deployment of United Nations troops in Darfur. This is indeed a challenge for the Government of National Unity to overcome.

This week provides a unique opportunity for the Government of the Sudan to trim down the public rhetoric, move forward and take the right decisions that will serve the interests of all Sudanese people.

The eyes of the world are set on New York in the coming days. Expectations are high for world leaders to do their utmost and to bring relief to the people of Darfur. We too will spare no efforts and, like Ambassador Bolton, I hope that all those invited to the meeting on Friday will be able to participate and that, through that meeting, as well as the other activities that are taking place in New York this week, we can all expedite the implementation of resolution 1706 (2006) and address the humanitarian crisis in Darfur.

In closing, I would like to inform the Council that Denmark supports the recommendation of the Secretary-General to extend the mandate of UNMIS for an additional 12 months. At the same time, we expect to see an expansion of UNMIS operations to Darfur no later than 1 January 2007, as has already been decided by this Council.

Mr. Manongi (United Republic of Tanzania): We thank Mr. Pronk for his insightful briefing.

We welcome what must be a cautious optimism expressed regarding the implementation of the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). It is encouraging that the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly is meeting regularly, that 300 kilometres of roads have been cleared of mines, that 1.6 million children in southern Sudan are going to school and that 160,000 displaced persons returned to southern Sudan in the first part of this year. We want to commend the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) for its contribution to the creation of an environment that has made those developments possible.

We are concerned, however, that, despite the small amount of progress that is being made, it has not been possible to fulfil the parties' security commitments, and issues relating to wealth- and power-sharing and the demarcation of borders have not been resolved. We thus call for more diligent effort from both sides in meeting their obligations in implementation of the provisions of the CPA.

At this juncture, we must also express our concern at the continued restrictions being placed on UNMIS. This need not be the case.

There is no doubt that implementation of the CPA will impact on the peace process in Darfur. Without significant progress in implementation of the CPA, efforts to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) will be curtailed. In the interest of the peoples of both southern Sudan and Darfur, we again urge the parties to the Agreement to work harder in all the tasks related to the CPA.

With regard to Darfur, we look forward to the meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council at the summit level planned for Wednesday. We hope that the proposal to extend the AMIS mandate will be endorsed by the summit so that the strengthening of the forces provided for in resolution 1706 (2006) can go ahead.

It is, however, worth recalling that when the Abuja peace negotiations were under way, many around this table and elsewhere felt that they were taking too long. Mr. Pronk has suggested that even if they had taken one year the result would have been the same.

We believe that the Darfur Peace Agreement provides the basic framework for peace in Darfur. We want to caution against encouraging parties outside the framework to seek different accommodation, beyond the terms of the DPA. Our effort will be well served if we steer the parties towards respecting that Agreement and encourage them to seek accommodation under its terms. Thus we continue to urge the Government of the Sudan to accept the transformation of AMIS into a United Nations mission.

Tanzania has suffered the humiliation of colonialism. We vow never again to yield to colonialism. We cherish our sovereignty and guard it jealously. We therefore will never be privy to any efforts to colonize or recolonize any country. The transformation of AMIS to a United Nations mission is in the interest of the Sudan and her people. It is not an exercise to recolonize Sudan. It needs to happen, and urgently.

Ms. Tincopa (Peru) (*spoke in Spanish*): We would like to thank Mr. Pronk for his excellent presentation. We think that the information he has given us is very useful. We are concerned at hearing that the implementation of the commitments under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is stagnant or has made only very little progress. We would like to urge all parties involved to comply fully with their commitments under the CPA and not give priority to some to the detriment of others.

I think it is important that we start to work urgently on the issues of the sharing of power and wealth, which are the cornerstone of the Agreement. Another aspect that needs urgent political commitment is the Ceasefire Commission.

The Sudan is growing economically and is benefiting from the high price of oil. It is important that the Government develop a policy of total transparency in its handling of oil revenues and assume its primary responsibility of guaranteeing the development of all the people of the Sudan. That can be done through policies and programmes to fight poverty and in a framework of full respect for human rights.

We agree with what the Secretary-General's report says with regard to the fact that donors and the international community should support the people of the Sudan in facing the challenges of the peace process and provide financial, technical and political assistance to carry out the programme of the CPA.

It has been said that peace is indivisible. Some of the progress that has been made under the CPA could be severely affected if at the same time no progress is

made in implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). We appreciate and share the five conditions that Mr. Pronk has put forward to get the DPA out of its deep coma. We regret that the Government of the Sudan does not wish to understand that the goal of the peacekeeping operation in Darfur is nothing other than to work cooperatively with its authorities for the implementation of the peace and security agreements and for the protection of the population in Darfur, which at present is not protected at all.

Developments in the field show that this is urgent. The deterioration of security conditions and the restricted humanitarian assistance mean that millions of people are at great risk, on the border of a humanitarian crisis. In this context, it is important that the Security Council, the regional organizations and all interested countries continue to seek a way to convince the Government to implement rapidly resolution 1706 (2006), in particular to support effective implement of the DPA and protection of civilians.

We would also like to say that we support the Secretary-General's recommendation to renew the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan.

We have a question for Mr. Pronk regarding the lack of political will in the Ceasefire Commission. What are the details behind this, and why have the ceasefire commitments been constantly violated?

Mr. Oshima (Japan): I thank Mr. Pronk, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for his informative and very useful briefing today. Japan commends the efforts of Mr. Pronk and his staff in the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to ensure respect for the ceasefire and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in the Sudan, and we shall continue to support their efforts. In this context, Japan will possibly consider the extension of the UNMIS mandate, as recommended by the Secretary-General and the draft resolution to that effect that the United States of America is circulating.

With regard to implementation of the CPA, we are gratified to note certain encouraging progress that has been made, including its security arrangements, such as the ongoing redeployment of the Sudan armed forces out of southern Sudan, the completed redeployment of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from eastern Sudan and implementation of other security mechanisms. On the other hand, it is a matter of concern that there have been considerable delays in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, security-sector reform and north-south border delineation issues. Concern must also be expressed over the lack of progress in implementation of the key issues such as those related to wealth-sharing and power-sharing. We would like to encourage the parties to make their utmost efforts towards progress in these areas.

On the question of Abyei, we have noted that the National Congress Party and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement have agreed to seek a political solution. We would expect the discussions between the two parties to lead towards a final solution. On the other hand, the multiple restrictions imposed on the activities of UNMIS are a matter for concern, and the situation must be ameliorated without delay.

While the recent resurgence of activities by the other armed groups in southern Sudan poses a serious threat to security in the region, the agreement on the cessation of hostilities between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army — the result of the mediation efforts of the government of Southern Sudan — is certainly a positive step which, we hope, will contribute to improving security in southern Sudan.

With respect to the situation in the east, we are looking forward to the early conclusion of the ongoing peace negotiations under the auspices of the Government of Eritrea.

On Darfur, we fully share the view that the handling of the Darfur Peace Agreement has a direct impact on the stability of the Sudan as a whole, and we therefore support the way that UNMIS has been responding to African Union requests for assistance relating to communications, logistics, transportation, public information and humanitarian issues. We also welcome the fact that UNMIS is continuing its efforts to persuade the non-signatory groups to support the Darfur Peace Agreement and the immediate implementation of resolution 1706 (2006).

All of this is fine and commendable. However, the reality that the international community is confronting in Darfur and the fate of the Darfur Peace Agreement are, indeed, fairly grim and a matter of deep concern. Mr. Pronk described the Darfur Peace Agreement as being in a coma, and set out five essential conditions for saving it. He said, in part, that we need to de-link what should be done today to save

the Darfur Peace Agreement from tomorrow's actions to get a renewed and fully robust peace force on the ground. I would like to ask Mr. Pronk to elaborate on what he meant by that and to provide a little more detail. I would also like to ask him to share with us his views on what he calls the contours of a plan for the longer term on Darfur.

In closing, Japan shares the view expressed by the Secretary-General that continued assistance to the people of the Sudan is essential if we are to meet their expectations for a peace dividend under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. Japan has to date already fulfilled its commitment made at the Oslo conference in 2004 by disbursing more than $1 billion. Japan intends to consider possible additional assistance for the consolidation of peace, humanitarian reconstruction and development in the Sudan.

Mr. Li Junhua (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): We would like to join previous speakers in thanking the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jan Pronk, for his insightful briefing. We would also like to thank him for his efforts on behalf of the north-south peace process in the Sudan.

We would like to raise two points. First, with regard to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in the years since its establishment, the Government of National Unity of the Sudan has, with the help of the international community, engaged in a serious manner in implementing that Agreement, and has made some progress. Although the situation is not fully to our liking, it is in general on the right track, and we appreciate that. At the same time, we hope that the north and the south of the Sudan will further enhance their confidence-building and cooperation efforts and fully implement the CPA.

We also welcome the fact that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) has almost completed its deployment there, having actively engaged in operations in accordance with its mandate as authorized by the Security Council. It has played a very important role in accelerating the implementation of the CPA and improving north-south reconciliation in the Sudan. We also support the extension of its mandate.

As the Secretary-General has pointed out, the peace process in the Sudan has entered a challenging stage and urgently requires international financial assistance so that disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, refugee resettlement and national reconstruction programmes can be implemented. We join the Secretary-General in urging donors to fulfil their commitments to provide timely assistance for the process so that the people of the Sudan can benefit from the peace dividend of the CPA and so that there can be true peace.

I would also like to refer to the situation in Darfur. Earlier, Mr. Jan Pronk raised five points in connection with the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). We appreciate his comments. In our view, the issue of Darfur has an important bearing on the CPA. However, it is also important to note that the Darfur issue is different from the north-south issue and therefore calls for a different solution that nonetheless takes into account the resolution of the north-south issue.

The United Nations Mission in the Sudan has played a very positive role because it has the support and cooperation of the Government of the Sudan. The deployment of a United Nations mission to Darfur should be based on the same principle. The United Nations Mission in the Sudan is engaged in very important negotiations on that issue, and we hope that the Security Council will support it and cooperate where necessary. In particular, it should take effective measures to overcome the difficulties faced by the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). We appreciate the fact that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan will continue to provide technical and logistical support to AMIS, and support that effort.

China also believes that, as long as the various parties in the Sudan continue to act in a spirit of mutual understanding, trust and cooperation and implement the CPA and the DPA, and provided that the international community provides support, there will be peace and stability there.

Mr. Burian (Slovakia): We would like to thank Mr. Pronk for his update today on the progress that has been made in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in the Sudan and on the situation in Darfur. My delegation commends the efforts of Mr. Pronk, as well as those of all United Nations staff in the Sudan, who are working tirelessly to help the people of the Sudan to attain peace and to build a better future.

We also acknowledge the key role played by the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in

support of the CPA, and we welcome the progress made in implementing the Agreement so far. At the same time, we share Mr. Pronk's observation about the fragility of peace in the south of the Sudan and the necessity of keeping the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on course. We are concerned about the widening confidence gap resulting from the lack of progress in the implementation of several aspects of the CPA, including power- and wealth-sharing commitments under the Agreement.

Another worrying aspect is the continuing deadlock concerning the status of the Abyei area. In this regard, we call on all stakeholders to make progress, because this issue continues to undermine the CPA and is threatening the security of the whole region. We agree with Mr. Pronk that the issue can be considered a test case for the implementation of the entire CPA, and we call on the Government of National Unity to resolve the issue of the demarcation between the north and the south as soon as possible, so as not to jeopardize the chance of peace between the north and the south of the Sudan.

Another important priority for the United Nations in the south should be — and here we agree with Mr. Pronk — support for security-sector reform. We commend the role of UNMIS in this regard.

We support the Juba peace talks between Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and the mediation role being played by the government of Southern Sudan. The signing on 26 August of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities was a positive development, and we hope that that trend will continue.

As Mr. Egeland told us on Friday (see S/PV.5525), Juba represents the best chance for peace in the region that we have had so far. We share the view that there can be no impunity for the crimes committed by the LRA. At the same time, however, it is crucially important that the peace process now continue and that it be shown that peace and justice can work together.

We welcome the improvement in the relations between the Sudan and Eritrea. In that regard, we would like to support the assistance provided by UNMIS in the talks between the Government of the Sudan and the Eastern Front. UNMIS should also be encouraged to support the efforts aimed at implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement as envisaged in resolution 1706 (2006). We regret that the position of the Sudanese Government has so far been negative. We fully agree with the observation made in the present report of the Secretary-General (S/2006/728) that, ultimately, the leaders in Khartoum bear full responsibility for the road that they ultimately choose.

Aware of the serious deterioration of the situation in Darfur, we believe that every effort should be undertaken to save the Darfur Peace Agreement and secure its full implementation. It cannot, however, be used as a pretext for attacking those who have not signed it. In our view, the only way to create favourable conditions for the peace process in Darfur is through a speedy transition to a robust United Nations-led operation able to cope with the complex situation on the ground. In that regard, we believe that all the provisions of resolution 1706 (2006) should be fully and expeditiously implemented.

We hope that the Sudanese Government will understand that active United Nations involvement in protecting civilians and facilitating the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement is in the best interests of all Sudanese people. We agree with Mr. Pronk that the long-term United Nations engagement in southern Sudan is the best proof that the Organization has no hidden agenda in the Sudan and that its only aim is to help the Sudanese people to establish a lasting and sustainable peace throughout the country.

Mr. Dolgov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We join in thanking Mr. Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan, for his comprehensive briefing. We note the progress made by the Sudanese parties in meeting their obligations under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, particularly in the area of security.

We undoubtedly see some positive momentum, but progress is very slow with regard to many aspects of the Agreement, and very little progress is being made in some important areas, including power-sharing and the sharing of revenues derived from natural resources, including oil exports. The issue of the north-south border has not yet been fully resolved. Of course, that is a complex matter. However, with active United Nations participation, we must make progress in these areas as soon as possible.

Of course, the Sudanese parties bear the primary responsibility in that regard. We have said on a number

of occasions that progress in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the north and the south would be assisted by the swift and effective resolution of conflict in other areas of the Sudan, particularly Darfur. We expect durable progress to be made soon in such areas, particularly eastern Sudan. We agree with the assessments made by the Secretary-General and Mr. Pronk in that regard.

With respect to Darfur, we noted with great interest the five elements that Mr. Pronk presented to the Security Council for consideration. In general, they appropriately reflect the issues that remain unresolved in the context of a Darfur settlement. It is clearly imperative that efforts be made to make the Darfur Peace Agreement as comprehensive as possible.

In that regard, I should like to ask Mr. Pronk what he believes will be the priority issues for future work with the Darfur parties that remain outside the Darfur Peace Agreement. The resolution of those issues will depend directly on the prospects for stabilization of the situation in Darfur. An important stabilizing role should be played by the African Union. We trust that its mandate will be extended beyond 30 September.

In that connection, my delegation very much looks forward to the meeting to be held in New York of the African Union Peace and Security Council. We hope that that meeting will be a success, both in terms of decisions to be taken regarding the future of African Union operations and in general with regard to the ongoing quest for a peaceful political and diplomatic solution to the Darfur crisis.

Following that meeting, the Security Council should probably meet once again to assess the situation on the basis of the decisions to be taken by the members of the African Union and the Sudanese parties.

Here, I wish to emphasize once again that, as my delegation has often stated both within and outside this Chamber, it is crucial to continue the constructive efforts and the dialogue with the Sudanese leadership in Khartoum to achieve a mutually acceptable settlement and to promote understanding of the United Nations peacekeeping role in Darfur. We see no alternative to that dialogue. We are well aware of the complexities of what the international community, including the United Nations, has undertaken in that regard, but the dialogue must continue. It is encouraging that the Secretary-General is carrying it forward and that he is in direct contact with the President of the Sudan.

Therefore, we expect that this effort of solidarity will have results that the Security Council will support with a view to reaching a prompt and comprehensive settlement in Darfur and throughout the Sudan.

Mr. Biabaorroh-Iboro (Congo) (*spoke in French*): My delegation wishes to thank Mr. Pronk for his comprehensive and enlightening briefing. We are grateful to the Secretary-General for submitting to the Council the report before us (S/2006/728), which makes it possible to follow the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the fulfilment of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) as envisaged in resolution 1590 (2005).

Although the report indicates that some progress has been made, it raises many worrisome issues. My delegation is concerned, to say the least, that the inordinately long wait for the dividends of peace will permanently dash the hopes of sorely afflicted populations, reignite the crisis and thus increase the people's suffering. We are seeing too much slowness. My delegation urges the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to resolutely implement all of its provisions, including with regard to the issue of power- and wealth-sharing.

My delegation is pleased at the work carried out by the United Nations Mission in the Sudan and its support for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with a view to promoting reconciliation between the parties, as well as its assistance to the African Union Mission in the Sudan. We regret that constraints have been placed upon its activities. Although security in southern Sudan has improved, the situation continues to be fragile because of the presence of armed groups and the circulation of weapons. We fear that this situation could jeopardize progress that has been achieved. The peace process under way in Darfur and in southern Sudan offers real opportunities that leaders in the Sudan should make the best of in order to ease the suffering of their people. My delegation also stresses that the Darfur-Darfur dialogue is an important element that aims at including all the parties in the implementation of the Agreement and at bolstering reconciliation. That process is essential for peace in Darfur.

In conclusion, I cannot fail to observe that rejecting a United Nations peacekeeping force and the withdrawal of UNMIS from the Darfur region pose an enormous risk; the international community cannot take such a risk, especially in the light of developments on the ground. We welcome the 26 August cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army. We hope that the agreement will help ease the suffering of the people in northern Uganda.

We support the Secretary-General's recommendation that the mandate of UNMIS be renewed for 12 months, until 24 September 2007. We take note of the invitation just issued by the delegation of the United States of America.

Mr. Yankey (Ghana): I too wish to express appreciation to Mr. Pronk for his very illuminating assessment of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). That assessment indicates a mixed record of success and setbacks. It also shows what a United Nations mission can accomplish when the receiving State embraces it as a partner in solving problems. We look forward to the draft resolution being proposed by the United States and to its early adoption.

As the report of the Secretary-General (S/2006/728) clearly shows, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) is already lending critical support to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). That confirms that the proposed expansion of UNMIS into Darfur is a logical, natural extension of what is already happening and is intended to enhance work that is already being done. So, I think the timely adoption of our resolution is very positive, and we call on all to cooperate.

The assessment that has been given is also very disturbing in some key aspects, particularly with regard to those parts of the CPA that seek to address the underlying causes of the conflict in southern Sudan. But the failures also show why the Darfur problem is so difficult to resolve, and perhaps why the Government of the Sudan is so vehemently opposed to the deployment of a United Nations mission.

To put it briefly, it seems to me that the Government of the Sudan must first take a certain strategic decision. That strategic decision is to accept all the ethnic groups in the Sudan as equal citizens, because that relates to the root cause of the conflict. We know clearly that that aspect of the CPA — the power-sharing, the wealth-sharing and the treatment of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) — has not worked. The constitutional review process, the legislative reform, the vital electoral laws: we have not made any progress there. And yet, they constitute the core of the power-sharing aspect of the Agreement.

With respect to wealth-sharing, we also know that there is a tussle between the National Petroleum Commission and the Ministry of Energy and Mining. Behind the technical manoeuvring, there is also the real problem of deciding what must go to whom. It is not just a technical or legal matter about who has the competence and so forth. Wealth-sharing is at the heart of the problem. The same applies to the boundaries — Abyei and the north-south boundary — as Mr. Pronk explained.

I would have liked not to make a linkage on a certain matter, but unfortunately, the facts cannot be interpreted otherwise. Here, I am talking about the treatment of the IDPs. We heard clearly what Mr. Pronk said: that sexual abuse is being used as a tool of war. How do we interpret the forced relocation of people in IPD camps? Why does UNMIS not have access to those people to find out what their needs are and then to stand up for them? Where are they? Are we to say that the bombing and the burning of villages are the first part of a strategy of confining people to the camps and then, later on, forcibly relocating them? I do not know, but that is what the facts on the ground suggest. We have to read those facts in the light of the power-sharing and wealth-sharing problems that have been highlighted in the report. For us, there can be no other interpretation, unless of course the Government of the Sudan can provide more information on that matter.

It is also obvious from the assessment given by the Special Representative that the Darfur Peace Agreement is falling apart, and not necessarily because some parties did not sign it, regrettable as that is. We do not make any excuses for the parties that did not sign the Agreement. But it is clear that they did not take up arms again and try to destabilize the situation; they simply did not sign the Agreement. Why did they not sign it? According to information available to us, they were not happy about two things: the wealth-sharing and the compensation. So, whichever way you go about it, you come back to core problem.

In conclusion, we are all very happy that the African Union and AMIS are playing a role. But let us not forget: what we are doing is not window-dressing. We are not interested in a window-dressing force that can be pushed around at will. We are interested in a force that can make a difference. If UNMIS was not even able to clear its communications equipment in eight months and is being restricted from certain parts of the Sudan, one may want to ask, concerning the proposed extension of the mandate of the mission, under what terms it is going to perform: what size and what mandate? Are they going to have unrestricted access? These are not issues we should gloss over, because these issues will make the difference between an UMIS that is able to perform on the one hand and business as usual on the other. We know that the presence of UNMIS has not made much of a significant difference in the situation in Darfur. So, as we consider what to do between now and 1 January, we should also not overlook the issues that I have highlighted: the size, the mandate and the question of access for UNMIS.

And finally, who is going to be accountable? War crimes have been committed, and they continue to be committed. That cannot be glossed over. What my delegation has been insisting on, particularly in the African context, is that all countries must be treated equally. What is bad in Côte d'Ivoire is bad in the Sudan. Today, Charles Taylor is languishing in jail. What is going to happen to those who have committed serious war crimes in the Sudan?

We do not have the answers, but these are not issues that we are prepared to sweep under the carpet.

Mr. Al-Qahtani (Qatar) (*spoke in Arabic*): I wish at the outset to thank Mr. Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan, for the efforts he and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) have made to bring about the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We commend the parties to the Agreement for their efforts to implement it, and the considerable progress made in the sharing of power and wealth. Still, some problems remain, which the parties should deal with in order to achieve security and stability and the welfare of their people. I encourage the United Nations Mission, and we agree with what Mr. Pronk said, that the redeployment of UNMIS to other regions such as Darfur would have dire consequences for peace in the south and for the fate of UNMIS.

As Mr. Pronk said, the presence of the African Mission in Darfur is a main and crucial element and cannot be disposed of. It could be strengthened by other units and other forces, and, consequently, we must keep that force to keep peace and security in Darfur. We all hope that the African Union Peace and Security Council will extend the mandate of AMIS in Darfur until it accomplishes the mission and the tasks for which it was set up. We reaffirm our support, through the League of Arab States, by providing all the necessary financial support and the support of the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference for the efforts of the African Union in Darfur. However, those efforts will not achieve their objectives without the United Nations, especially the Security Council.

In brief, we should deal with the situation in Darfur objectively and transparently, and we should avoid political arrogance, racial and ethnic allegations, political hypocrisy and double standards. We now know that it is the rebel movements that present obstacles to the peace efforts in Darfur. They should be punished, in consonance with Security Council resolutions, because this Council has not dealt firmly with the violations committed by members of the rebel movements. That encourages those who are against the Agreement to escalate their violence in order to erode the DPA. We therefore should deal with them firmly, and not continue to blame the Sudanese Government when it tries to repel aggression in the protection of its national security and territorial integrity. We hope to know Mr. Pronk's views with regard to that matter and how we might tackle it.

We agree with the representative of the United Kingdom that the Government of the Sudan must provide security for its citizens in Darfur. However, the protection of civilians, if performed by the Sudanese Government, would be considered, as some said, a violation of resolution 1590 (2005). Once again, what solution could Mr. Pronk provide in answer to this question and this contradiction?

We hope that we do not close the door to dialogue with the Sudanese Government, and that we refrain from taking impractical steps or do not stymie the efforts being undertaken by other international actors, especially the Secretary-General, with the Government of the Sudan.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity in my national capacity.

I would like first to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Pronk, for his comprehensive statement on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), as well as on the situation in Darfur. The conclusion that one draws from the Secretary-General's recent report is that the implementation of the CPA has slowed, and that although there is notable progress with regard to security arrangements, the same cannot be said about the provisions for sharing power and wealth.

We welcome the fact that the Government has deployed its forces from southern Sudan and that accordingly the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has completed its redeployment from eastern Sudan. We encourage both sides to show the same resolve in the formation of joint integrated units. It is also encouraging that the economy of the country is booming and that finally the economy of the south is starting to reap the rewards of peace, after years of war and deprivation. Of course, there is still a lot that has to be done, and the funds promised by the international community must arrive sooner rather than later.

On the negative side, the issue of Abyei, the proper functioning of the National Petroleum Commission, the non-establishment of human rights commissions, the insecurity in the south because of the presence of other armed groups, and the non-existent preparations for national elections are just some of the obvious examples of the slow implementation of the CPA.

Notwithstanding these issues, we believe that the key element that will ultimately define the future of the CPA is the gradual consolidation of a spirit of cooperation and trust between the two parties. In that regard, there is still much ground to be covered.

With regard to Darfur, we agree with the Secretary-General's assessment that peace in Sudan is indivisible. The crisis in Darfur, if not resolved soon, may have a spillover effect in the rest of the country. We once again call for the full implementation of resolution 1706 (2006) by all sides and for the upholding of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). In addition, allowing humanitarian access to the people in need is of pivotal importance. I wish to emphasize that we all must work collectively to address the present crisis for the benefit of all the people in Sudan and the region as a whole.

I also wish to ask Mr. Pronk what is the best action the Council could take to have all the parties involved sign the DPA in order to bring peace to the country. At the same time, I would like to thank Denmark and the United States for their initiative regarding a meeting next Friday.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I give the floor to Mr. Pronk to comment on questions that have been raised.

Mr. Pronk: There was a question concerning the south, which is, of course a question concerning the country as a whole. It concerned the elections provided for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. There is no concrete reason to expect that they will not take place. However, nobody is preparing for them. We need a census before elections, and preparations for the census are lagging so far behind that it will be a big problem to have the elections take place in time. It is being discussed politically at the moment; so far it is not being discussed in the institutions. We are preparing for elections within our mandate, but we cannot organize or start elections; we can only facilitate and support them.

I thank delegations for their questions concerning Darfur. They all related to what I said about the short-term plan, the delinking and the longer run. Let me try to focus on these three issues.

First, members of the Security Council will remember that for the short run — and this means between now and the end of the year — I said to broaden the basis of support and secure a truce, because there is more and more fighting at the moment. Reform the Ceasefire Commission, get a better Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and avoid a collision course.

The question was addressed to me of how the Ceasefire Commission came about. Agreement was reached on 9 May. When we got the mandate for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) from the Security Council in resolution 1590 (2005) of 24 March 2005, I instructed the UNMIS Commander to call for the first meeting of the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) on 24 March — right away. The Ceasefire Commission did not meet after the signing of the DPA. It was postponed and postponed and

postponed. That was the first major blunder. There were no meetings — but there were violations. The Minni Minawi faction attacked the Abdul Wahid faction, and it later withdrew; there was conflict between G19 and the Government. None of these violations were ever addressed: there was no meeting. So the message was that you can violate without being sanctioned. This was exactly the same situation as in the Ceasefire Commission after the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004. The whole idea was to build something new. But it was not new; it was the same. That was the first problem.

The second problem was that after they started meeting, six weeks later, the two signatories, the Government and Minni Minawi, were brought together, and they became allies. They said that all the others should first sign and then they could join. So you had ceasefire violations of the previous agreements as well, which had been signed by Abdul Wahid and others. They could not be discussed at the meeting, because half of the parties to the fight were not allowed to be present. You are being attacked, but you must sign first and then you can participate in the meeting. Of course, they did not do this.

I presented six options to solve the problem: subcommittees, et cetera. They were all rejected.

The DPA says that Darfur should be brought into a system of demilitarized zones, buffer zones and neutral zones. This zoning should be done by the Ceasefire Commission. There was no zoning exercise whatsoever. It ought to have started before a specific deadline. The deadline meant nothing anymore. Every deadline was simply shifted aside. There was no zoning. Instead of the zoning, which ought to have been based on the status quo on the date of the signing, parties started to increase their own zones by fighting. And they could do so, because nobody said that it should not be done or that it was a violation: they did not meet, or if they met, the issue could not be raised by the parties because they themselves were doing it.

The Janjaweed disarmament plan is, of course, the most important thing, but the word has hardly been mentioned. It was presented by the Government — late — but at least there was a plan. That plan should have been discussed, addressed and approved — or disapproved and then improved through the Ceasefire Commission. It has not been discussed so far in the Commission. But it is the most important issue.

The United Nations is only an observer. I myself was in Abuja in order to get the United Nations as a member, but the international community was not interested. So we are an observer. I send my Deputy Force Commander, who is not just any person, to the Commission meetings — assuming they take place. Very often, when he arrives by plane at Al-Fashir, they say "Oh, the meeting is not taking place; it has been postponed because the Government is not yet ready", or whatever. This has happened four times. If the meeting takes place and if he raises an issue, he is silenced. The United States, also an observer at the Commission, is also being silenced. The European Union, as a member, does not protest against the silencing of the United Nations in the Ceasefire Commission.

The Commission is dead in its present form. I am withdrawing my Deputy Force Commander from the meetings, because he cannot speak anyway. He is not allowed to raise issues. That is the answer to the question.

The Ceasefire Commission has to be reformed, renewed, to make it independent and fully representative for everybody who is fighting to get a ceasefire. And it must be authoritative, as the CJMC is in the south: it has had dozens of meetings. Parties come, and they fight in the meetings. That is definitely what you have to do. But then they reach a kind of conclusion, and we see implementation. We send our monitors through the whole of south Sudan, and they raise issues. The system is tripartite, and if one of the parties does not show up for some reason, we leave. In the Ceasefire Commission, the parties can say, "Well, we do not have monitors". That is not a tripartite system. The monitors cannot go to see, question and investigate what is going on in Darfur. The Ceasefire Commission is also in a coma. That is the answer.

It has to be improved and renewed. Otherwise, fighting and violations will continue, and nothing will be implemented. This means that you also have to bring all the other groups into the Ceasefire Commission. Some of them did not want to sign, but they did not fight. They said that they would abide by previous agreements, from N'djamena onwards. We had quite a number of agreements, and they did abide. One did not — a new group, the New Redemption Front (NRF) — and they carried out an attack in West Kordofan. That was truly a very bad start to the month of July. But, as I said, since then they are constantly

being attacked. Now it is an all-out war between the Government and that new movement.

You have to talk with them: they have power, they have weapons, and they want to talk. But if all you do is to tell them that they must first stop and then can join, it is not going to happen, whether you like it or not. And the aim, of course, is to achieve peace on the ground.

Bring all of them on board — in the Ceasefire Commission and in all the other committees. The more you say that they should stay out of all the institutions of the DPA, the more the constituency of all these groups will lose faith in the DPA. It is a self-fulfilling prophecy at the moment. That is why you have to broaden this process.

This also means that although the DPA is a good text in itself, you have to start talking again, and you have to find a way to start talking without calling the talks a re-opening. Such a diplomatic trick can always be found. But you must add a number of issues without reducing what is in the DPA. What are some of those issues? The representative of Ghana mentioned compensation and wealth. As for compensation, I definitely agree. It is a small amount of money. Thirty million dollars for, I would say, 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons is not enough. But in the DPA it is said that the initial figure is $30 million. So if you raised it to $200 million, bringing us to a reasonable amount of money per family, even in their own view, you would not violate the DPA because it only said "initially" $30 million. So you can be creative; you could easily use some of the international money designated as reconstruction funds, for example, for a purpose like this.

Secondly, how can we bring about further improvement? I think Minni Minawi should, with his faction, take a step backwards. He occupies many positions: he is Senior Assistant to the President and Chair of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority as well — if it starts. He has it all. To bring the others on board, put international pressure on him to take a step backwards in order to give others some room. It might be helpful. That is not a violation of the DPA because nowhere does it say that one person should have all those positions. It could be done differently. You could play with the numbers with regard to the groups in the councils: instead of 20, make it 25 and so forth. Playing with the numbers merely to renegotiate some other numbers without really changing the overall agreement is always possible. This is also face-saving for leaders of those other movements, who have to inform their own constituencies that some talks have taken place and that they got something, so that it is now really worthwhile to sign the agreement.

Then, of course, there is the disarmament of the Janjaweed. The representative of Ghana is quite right that money is important for these people. However, the most important reason why the people on the ground do not believe in the DPA is their fear of the Janjaweed. That is the overriding issue. If you go into the field — to the Jebel Marra or the camps — the people always ask, "What about the Janjaweed and the DPA?" They will do anything to stop the Janjaweed. It is true. The Government says that it is not true, but there are indications that quite a number of the Janjaweed have been incorporated into the security force. That may be good or not good. It is a specific way to disarm. In any case, the people on the ground, who have always said that everything is one and the same body, think that this is still the case. This is extremely important. In order to get the people to accept the DPA, the Janjaweed should be stopped. And that is not happening — the contrary is true.

This brings me to the question of the de-linking. I use that word for a number of reasons. De-link what you have to do today from what you have to do tomorrow. I use today and tomorrow nearly literally. Today we must address these points, which I have mentioned, relating to broadening, a truce and reform of both the Ceasefire Commission and the DPA. Why the need for de-linking? The most important thing is peace on the ground. You get a peace agreement in order to facilit... a peace on the ground, and you get a robust international force in order to monitor a good peace agreement. Make the robust force the instrument, not the objective. It is an instrument to reach an objective.

This year, understandably, nearly all of the talk was about the force, the robust force, and the specific form of the force. But had to be done on the ground in order to get the people behind the peace agreement gradually receded beyond the horizon.

De-link: support the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). AMIS can be a good force; they were in the beginning. They are less so at the moment for quite a number of reasons. Do not ask me to elaborate.

Support for AMIS can, of course, be made conditional upon the transition, but then you do not de-link it. A very strong force must be on the ground as soon as possible in order to protect the people. If supporting AMIS is dependent on the acceptance of the transition, the force will be postponed because the transition will not be easily accepted.

So de-link, and do it. Make the force as robust as possible. That is the terminology I have always used in the Council, without saying that it should be from the African Union or from the United Nations. Members will remember the terminology that I have always used: Robust, strong, big and broad. Broad mandates like the one outlined in resolution 1706 (2006), which is a good, broad mandate, are better mandates for a force than previous mandates. A bigger force must be mandated — 17,000 or 18,000 — and it must be deployed everywhere.

Regarding the discussions on the transition, I ask members to accept my advice from the field; they have the right to my advice. Resolution 1706 (2006) "invites" (*para. 1*) the Government to give its consent to the transition. The Council said under the presidency of the United Kingdom that there would be consultation and that there would not be any force against the consent of the Government. This means that the Council will have to acquire that consent. It will not acquire that consent by repeating that they have to consent. That is not politics. So, make it attractive. Everybody thinks at the moment that the next meeting between a specific aide from one country and a diplomat from another country will perhaps create that consent. It will not. The underlying factors at the moment have to be analysed. Why does the Government of the Sudan not give its consent? Whether you like it or not, analyse the underlying factors.

The Government of the Sudan bears responsibility for devilish, atrocious acts, especially in 2003; less now, but in particular during the past. Let me play devil's advocate. The Council must understand Khartoum. How does one get their consent? Either one must make the offer attractive in the present situation, or in some other way.

First, here is how to make it attractive. A consultation — a negotiation, because they are an equal partner — might also result in a package, whereby they accept the transition and they get, for instance, commitments: economically, debt relief; trade, lifting of the sanctions; security, staying in power and security cooperation. The Government of the Sudan is anti-United Nations and anti-West in terms of peacekeeping, not only because they are angry, but also because there is fear of radical groups which will attack the Government itself. The beheading of Mr. Taha, the likes of which was certain to happen eventually, as a signal, is a phenomenon that has spread fear throughout Khartoum.

There are groups that will attack the Government if the Government says "yes" to the big Powers of the world. Those groups are there and are coming, so there is also some legitimate fear. Devilish things have happened in Africa, but you have to negotiate. You have to analyse the underlying structural forces — I just mentioned some of them — in order to get consent. You must try, rather than just say you have to accept. It does not work.

If you study all the statements made by all the leaders in the Sudan since about 10 February, they have been consistent. You cannot accuse the Government of the Sudan of not having been very clear and consistent. It says no, and it gets more and more support for that "no". Even the friends of the United Nations and the friends of the CPA — Vice-President Taha was here in this Chamber a year ago — have made a very clear anti-transition statement. Those who are in favour of the transition in the Sudan have no power whatsoever. Mini Minawi is used up. He has no power. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement speaks but will not make it a political issue, and the Government's opposition — the other parties — do not have the people on the streets, and the Government knows that.

The consent will not be given very easily, so we have to talk, even with people who have carried out or were responsible for atrocious things in the past. I think it would be wise to think ahead. If the Government does not accept the invitation — "accept the invitation" is the language used — it might be useful to begin thinking ahead already, because to ask every time for another month of the presence of the African Union is not in the interests of the people over there. They are scared in Darfur.

There are, of course, also other options. You can define transition. What type? The Security Council has the right to my advice, even if it is not exactly the same language which it has laid down in the resolution.

Chapter VIII is difficult, I know, but Chapter VIII is a possibility. It is a possibility on the basis of the Charter. The Government, I am certain, will accept Chapter VIII. It has made that clear already.

Another possibility is major support, financed out of the United Nations budget, not by going around from one capital in the North to another capital in the North to beg. Major United Nations structural support for the African Union in order to make it really effective is also a possibility. I think the Government would accept that — an African Union force, but very strongly embedded in United Nations support that is secured for the long run, with all the expertise necessary, but still called an African Union force. That would be a face-saving device for the Government of the Sudan. It comes close to what I proposed to the Security Council one and a half years ago at the same meeting — a joint African Union/United Nations operation.

That is only plan B. It would come into effect only after the invitation is not accepted, but at a certain moment I think it will be necessary, given the present political configuration, to think about what is possible and, at the same time, effective. We have been very disappointed by the African Union over the past couple of months, and what I have said about the Ceasefire Commission adds to that, because it is being led by the African Union. But it is not inherently weak; it can be much better. It can be helped, also, to be much better, as it was in the last couple of months of 2004 and in 2005. It can be improved again.

Predictions for the longer run, very briefly, only make sense if, in the short term, such changes are accepted. Secondly, it is extremely important to deal with the root causes of the problem in Darfur, so we have also to talk with the people — Arabs, Arab tribes, nomads — whose interests are also at stake. If they do not think that their interests are going to be preserved, that is again a source of conflict. That has to be addressed in the Darfur-Darfur dialogue. The preparations and the whole dialogue have not yet started. It is necessary to do that as soon as possible with all groups, not only those that have taken sides, and particularly with the others that would find a reason to continue to use their weapons rather than to find a solution that is related to other land-tenure systems and to the sharing of water. All those issues have to be brought into that framework.

I wish it would have been possible for the United Nations to lead the Darfur-Darfur dialogue. I have always asked, in our internal discussions, for the United Nations to be given the political lead on Darfur and the African Union the military. The Darfur-Darfur dialogue would have been different.

We must also deal with reconciliation. It is extremely important. The tribal dimension in Darfur is underrated in its effect and its importance. There are major tribal problems. I can say, for instance, that in July the biggest number of casualties — people dead — were not the result of attacks by the parties on civilians; 150 people were killed because of a tribal conflict that was not related in any way to the war in the South Sudan. As is so often the case, dozens upon dozens of deaths are the results of tribal conflict. It is underestimated. It has to be brought together; it is all related to economic, land, water and other specific issues.

We have also to discuss returns and to set an example — not an overall return for each and every body at the same time, but a start to the process regionally, locally, in order to show, with the help of protective forces, that it does work and that those people can go back and start to produce their own food again, so that confidence is built gradually.

I would give that process a number of years. Darfur and the addressing of the root problems cannot be solved in a year or two. It will take as many years as we are giving to the United Nations Mission in the Sudan in the framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. That is at least seven years.

The President: I thank Mr. Pronk for the clarifications he has provided.

There are no more speakers on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.